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INTRODUCTION TO SPECIAL DATA REVIEW FORUM 
Govinda Clayton (University of Kent) 
 
There has recently been huge expansion in the availability of systematic data on peacekeeping 
missions. Data capturing the size and composition of peacekeeping operations has improved in 
depth and breadth, and is now complemented by a collection of disaggregated and geo-coded 
data. This means that rather than simply measuring the presence or absence of peacekeeping 
within a conflict or state, data is now available on a range of more specific indicators such as the 
location and response to specific peacekeeping events (c.f. Dorussen and Ruggeri this issue). The 
rapid growth in the range and quality of peacekeeping data has produced new insights, and offers 
greater opportunities for researchers attempting to analyse a range of policy-relevant questions. 
Yet despite the burgeoning collection of peacekeeping work, there remain areas in which 
understanding is weak or deficient. Moreover, whilst the community of peace scientists that 
regularly engage in quantitative research are often familiar with the existence of new (and 
existing) datasets, the broader community of peace and conflict researchersÑin particular those 
from the policy worldÑare often unaware of the significant progress that has been made in this 
field. As a result, the potential for systematically collected and analysed peacekeeping data to 
have a real impact on policy debates often remains unrealised. This special data section was 
conceived as a means to address these inadequacies: firstly by providing a forum for those 
leading the development of quantitative peacekeeping data to communicate the current state of 
the field to the broad academic and policy readership of International Peacekeeping; and 
secondly, as an opportunity for researchers to highlight some of the areas in which future data 
collection efforts should be focused.  
 
The prequel to this collection of short essays was a roundtable at the International Studies 
Association annual convention in Atlanta, in March 2016. The roundtableÑwhich was 
sponsored by International PeacekeepingÑincluded presentations from six scholars at the 
forefront of developments in peacekeeping data. This discussion highlighted some of the key 
developments recently observed in the collection and analysis of peacekeeping data, but also 
revealed areas in which more research was required. This special data section includes 
contributions from each of the roundtable participants, as well as five distinguished scholars with 
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significant experience in the collection and analysis of peacekeeping data, and a PhD student 
who attended the roundtable and played an active role in the discussion.  
In this collection of nine short essays the participants discuss how their own data collection 
efforts contribute to peacekeeping knowledge (e.g. the known knowns), possible synergies 
between datasets, and areas in which extensions and further research is required (e.g. the known 
unknowns). More specifically, Jacob Kathman discusses personnel contributions and 
compositions of United Nations peacekeeping missions, offering a brief summary of the data he 
collected on monthly force contributions and mission capacity, and highlighting research 
questions that emerge from this work. Kyle Beardsley also discusses force contributions, but 
surveys a wider range of data sources, in particular highlighting the limitations with regard to 
assessing gender inequity. Ismene Gizelis and Louise Olsen also focus on gender, highlighting 
where enhancements are required with respect to disaggregated gender data. Vincenzo Bove, 
Andrea Ruggeri and Remco Zwetsloot introduce a new dataset that extends previous data on 
force composition by focusing on leadership, providing information on the nationality, tenure 
and experience of each Special Representative of the Secretary General and Force Commander 
for UN PKOs in Africa and Asia, The authors offer some preliminary analysis and note some of 
the possible applications of their new data. Jair van der Lijn and Timo Smit reflect on the 
considerable and long-standing data collection efforts undertaken by the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) whichÑin addition to information on personnel and country 
contributorsÑalso provides data on fatalities, budgets and non-UN missions. The authors also 
set out SIPRIÕs agenda for future data collection efforts. Moving beyond force composition, Han 
Dorussen and Andrea Ruggeri set out the need for greater data disaggregation in peacekeeping 
data, in particular differentiating between the place and space of peacekeeping, and introduce 
their collection of event datasets which maps the points where peacekeepers are either actors or 
targets of an action at a specific location and time point. Lisa Hultman next discusses a new 
project identifying the various activities undertaken by peacekeepers when attempting to protect 
civilians, and offers useful reflections on the limitations and challenges associated with coding 
UN Secretary General reports. Paul Diehl expands the focus of the discussion, highlighting some 
of the potential perils associated with assessing peacekeeping using other non-peacekeeping data 
that were not originally designed this purpose (e.g. conflict fatality measures). Diehl also offers 
suggestions for untapped data resources that could be used to assess a broader range of 
peacekeeping effects. Laura Bosco offers a brief summary of United Nations Peacekeeping data 
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and highlights the advantagesÑfor both the UN and researchersÑfor greater collaboration in 
this area. Finally, Christina Goodness, the chief of the UN peacekeeping information 
management unit, reflects on some of the key points raised in the data forum from a UN and 
practitioners perspective.  
 
 
Collectively the essays offer a comprehensive survey of the current state-of-the-field in 
peacekeeping data collection efforts, and we hope will be a useful source for both new and 
existing users of peacekeeping data.   
 
 5 




Department of Political Science 
University at Buffalo, SUNY 
 
Much of the literature on United Nations peacekeeping has sought to assess the effectiveness of 
UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in pursuing peace in war-torn countries. Recent 
data collection efforts have attempted to contribute to this endeavor by disaggregating 
information on UN PKOs in terms of their composition, activities, and experiences in the field. 
Initial quantitative assessments of peacekeeping largely relied upon rudimentary representations 
of PKOs in their empirical models, often employing dichotomous indicators of the presence or 
absence of a mission in a given host state in attempting to reveal the general effect of 
peacekeeping. However, what recent data collection projects have revealed is that peacekeeping 
missions come in many shapes and sizes, are variously mandated, deploy to heterogeneous 
locations, and are faced with variously complex challenges. In this paper, I touch on my own 
data collection efforts that seek to add detail on PKO deployments, pointing to research 
questions that can be effectively addressed with these data. 
 
UN Mission Composition 
Initial work on peacekeeping effectiveness was largely qualitative, often focusing on a particular 
case or a handful of cases in an attempt to delineate the factors that were associated with mission 
success or failure. While rich in detail and historiographic rigor, these studies tended to suffer 
from a lack of inter-case comparison, often selecting on the dependent variable and arriving at 
deterministic outcomes. Subsequent quantitative work assessed differences in cases to which 
PKOs were and were not deployed, noting that the UN tended to select rather difficult cases, and 
often indicating that PKOs were generally effective in achieving a number of intervention goals.
1
 
Yet, while there was some delineation between what types of missions were deployed, the data 
generally did not account for heterogeneity across missions. As such, early quantitative analyses 
were limited in their policy advice beyond promoting the fact that peacekeeping generally 
appeared effective. 
                                                                  
1
 For a review of this literature, see Fortna and Howard ÔPitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature.Õ 
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This is an interesting shortcoming particularly because much of the theorizing in the literature on 
peacekeeping effectiveness has focused on the security dilemma that is present between 
combatants seeking resolution to their hostilities. The security dilemma hampers cooperation 
between the combatants, making it difficult to credibly commit to conflict resolution. The 
availability of third party security guarantees in the form of intercession and observation is thus 




Yet, often missed in peacekeeping research is that the capacity of missions varies in terms of 
their ability to provide security guarantees. Consider, for example, Figure 1 which plots troop 
deployments to three missions by month over the course of the mid-1990s. The series of 
missions to Somalia (UNOSOM) is notable for its enormous troop deployment and its rapid 
escalation and demobilization. By contrast, the series of missions to Angola (UNAVEM) 
included only a handful of troops for years before gradually escalating its troop deployment to 
more moderate levels. Further, the mission to Mozambique (ONUMOZ) ramped up its troop 
commitment, and waffled in deployment size before plateauing and deescalating. These missions 
are distinct from one another in their deployments and in terms of their capacities to pursue their 
specific peace processes. 
 
Figure 1: Peacekeeping Troop Contributions to Three Missions  
                                                                  
2




What is readily apparent when studying mission capacity is that the UNÕs missions are not at all 
homogenous, as analyses employing PKO dummy variables would implicitly assume. Instead, 
missions like those to Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, and the DRC are deployed with 
tens of thousands of personnel to carry out mission functions while many other missions have 
only a fraction of these personnel levels.  
 
To capture these differences, I have collected data for all missions globally at the monthly level 
via reports made available on the Department of Peacekeeping Operations website for the 1990 
to 2014 period.
3
 The data include information on the number of deployed troops, police, and 
unarmed observers. With information on mission capacity, many opportunities for peacekeeping 
research become available. Initial research seems to indicate that mission capacity does in fact 
matter in differentiating between mission with regard to their effectiveness on such issues as 
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However, dynamic data on mission capacities might be usefully employed in assessing a variety 
of additional indicators of effectiveness including assessments of peace agreement durability, 
post-conflict democratization and economic recovery, peacekeeper abuses, and others. Further, 
given the dynamism in PKO deployment size, research can critically assess the means by which 
the UN responds (or does not respond) to conditions on the ground.
5
 What explains personnel 
(de-)escalations? What factors affect the various personnel combinations that constitute 
missions? What explains the UNÕs routine inability to meet the designated personnel levels that 
are mandated by the Security Council?
6
 Do some theories of institution behavior receive more 
support than others in terms of mission personnel dynamics? These and other questions can be 
usefully assessed with fine-grained data on UN PKO deployments. 
 
UN Member State Personnel Contributions 
In addition to mission-level data, I also have assembled data at the level of member state 
contributions to PKOs as part of the same data collection project. These data report the number 
of troops, police, and observers contributed by each UN member state to each PKO for each 
month in the post-Cold War period. While much of the literature on UN peacekeeping has 
focused on mission effectiveness, less research has studied personnel contribution processes. The 
relative lack of focus on why countries contribute personnel to missions is a bit curious. If 
peacekeeping composition is an important element of mission effectiveness, then evaluating why 





Contributor-level data should be useful toward this end. First, while the contributor data is 
presented in a format that records each member stateÕs monthly contribution to individual 
                                                                  
4
 Hultman et. al ÔUnited Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War.Õ; ÔBeyond Keeping Peace: United Nations 
Peacekeeping Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting.Õ; ÔUnited Nations Peacekeeping Dynamics and the Duration of post-civil 
Conflict Peace.Õ; Kathman and Wood ÔStopping the Killing during the ÔPeaceÕ: Peacekeeping and the Severity of Post-Conflict 
Civilian Victimization.Õ; Beardsley and Gleditsch ÔPeacekeeping as Conflict ContainmentÕ.  
5
 For an example in the context of civil war, see Benson and Kathman ÔUN Bias and Force Commitments in Civil War.Õ. 
6
 For instance, see Passmore et al. ÔRallying the Troops: Collective Action and Self-Interest in UN Peacekeeping Contributions.Õ. 
7
 Some research has begun to address explanations of member state contributions. For examples, see Bove and Elia . ÔSupplying 
Peace: Participation in and Troop Contribution to Peacekeeping Missions.Õ; Gaibulloev et al. . ÔDemands for UN and Non-UN 
Peacekeeping: Nonvoluntary versus Voluntary Contributions to a Public Good.Õ, and Uzonyi ÔRefugee flows and state 
contributions to post-Cold War UN peacekeeping missions.Õ . 
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missions, these data are easily aggregated to the contributor-month level thus allowing tests of 
supply-side theories of personnel contributions. There is a good deal of variation in these data, 
both across member states and by particular states over time. For instance, consider Figure 2 
which plots BangladeshÕs personnel commitments to all PKOs over time. Like Bangladesh, a 
handful of states, including India and Pakistan, have increased their personnel contributions 
massively in the post-Cold War era. Others, like several Scandinavian states, contribute often, 
but in lower numbers. Many others rarely (or never) contribute. What explains this variation? 
One interesting pattern pointed out by Lebovic
8
 is that wealthy, Western nations have greatly 
reduced their personnel commitments. In their place, PKOs have been staffed by states that are 
not particularly powerful, tend to have lower quality soldiers, and are generally lower-
performing in human rights practices. What explains these patterns, and what consequences do 
they have for peacekeeping processes?
9
 These are sorely understudied issues for which we now 
have data to test new theorizing. 
 
Figure 2: Total Personnel Contributed by Bangladesh over Time 
                                                                  
8
 Lebovic. ÔPassing the Burden: Contributions to UN Peace Operations in the Post-Cold War Era.Õ 
9
 As a step forward in this literature, see the Bove et al. contribution to this forum for a discussion of mission composition as it 




Second, the data also allow evaluations of personnel commitments to particular missions. Why 
do member states accept the costs and risks associated with making such contributions? What 
motivates states to deploy to a particular host-state relative to others? Are there important 
contributor-host interstate relations that reveal patterns in personnel commitments? Are there 
institutional motivations?  
 
Consider Figure 3, which reports personnel contributions to the UN mission in Rwanda 
(UNAMIR) during RwandaÕs civil war and genocide. The story of UNAMIRÕs withdrawal is 
well known. Soon after the genocideÕs initiation, several Belgian peacekeepers were killed, and 
Belgium responded by withdrawing its troops. Having gutted the centerpiece of UNAMIRÕs 
troop capacity, many other contributor states followed Belgium out of Rwanda. From this 
anecdote, maybe there is something more generally that we can expect in the relationship 
between rising hostilities/blue helmet deaths and member state troop withdrawals, including a 
potentially interrelated nature of troop withdrawals across contributor states. Interestingly, 


































































































































Bangladesh (to all PKOs)
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commitments to UNAMIR soon thereafter, ostensibly at great risk to their soldiers. What 
explains such behavior? Are there institutional means by which the UN can motivate 
contributions even under difficult conditions? Are states primarily motivated by narrow self-
interest that can be satisfied by making such personnel commitments? In what way does a 
contributorÕs domestic context create (dis)incentives for making contributions? Do massive 
contributions come from states committed to internationalist ideals, or are they provided by 
states that reap narrowly defined domestic benefits from deploying their military abroad?
10
 These 
and other questions can be tested with the personnel contribution data in ways that were not 
previously possible. 
 
Figure 3: Personnel Contributions to UNAMIR by Ghana, Tunisia, and Belgium
 
 
Two important elements of the PKO contribution process open the door to some very interesting 
theorizing and empirical evaluations using these data. First, while there is not endless demand for 
                                                                  
10
 For examples of such narrow state-centric benefits as deploying blue helmets for the purposes of coup-proofing and 
preparation for interstate conflict, see Kathman and Melin ÔWho Keeps the Peace? Understanding State Contributions to UN 













peacekeeping contributions, missions often do not reach their mandated personnel targets. Thus, 
while member states cannot deploy infinite amounts of peacekeeping personnel, there is often 
considerable space to make contributions. Second, personnel contributions are voluntary on the 
part of the member states. Taken together, the opportunity for contributions is practically 
universally present to all states, and it is thus a matter of motivating their involvement. As such, 
there would seem to be near unlimited room for theorizing on state motivations for contributing 
blue helmets for which the data exists to test these arguments. Paired with the suggestions made 
earlier in this piece, testing personnel contributions should have interesting downstream 
consequences for our understanding of peacekeeping effectiveness, as well. The result is a fertile 
field for new theorizing and empiricism on peacekeeping processes. 
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Advances in the Analysis of Contributor-Level Peacekeeping Data, with a 





UN peacekeeping missions rely on contributions from many Member States.
1
 For example, in 
2007, the UNMIS mission in Sudan had 74 different countries contribute forces to the mission.
2
 
Recent empirical studies have begun to explore both the sources of variation in country 
contributions to UN missions and the consequences of that variation. This essay surveys the 
advances that some of those studies have made, discusses limitations to the data collection and 
analysis efforts, and recommends investments that might be made to improve related data-driven 
research agendas going forward. In particular, the essay argues that the available data only allow 
for researchers to scratch the surface with regard to assessing gender inequity in peacekeeping 
operations. Adding additional demographic information of the peacekeepers, as well as more 
specific information on the roles that the peacekeepers play, would greatly improve our 
understanding of improvements that have been realized and challenges that remain in the ability 




The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) publishes monthly data on its website 
regarding the contributions of countries to peacekeeping missions. From 1990 to 2000, the data 
include the total number of contributions that each contributor made, but the data are inconsistent 
in whether they also include information that pairs the contributions to the destination missions. 
In 2001, the monthly data began to consistently include the pairings of contributor countries and 
missions. Moreover, from 2002 on, the data include both the contributor-mission pairings and the 
breakdowns by post (e.g., observers, troops and police). Starting in November of 2009, the 
UNDPKO began to publish this information further broken down by gender (male or female). 
                                                                  
1
 This paper focuses exclusively on UN peacekeeping missions and the respective available data. 
2
 This was the highest number of contributors to any mission in KathmanÕs data (Kathman, ÔUnited Nations Peacekeeping 
Personnel CommitmentsÕ). 
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So, after 2009, we now know how many men and women of each type of peacekeeper post each 
contributing country sent to each mission in each month. 
Kathman has aggregated the basic contributor-mission-post data from the UN website 
and has begun to update these data periodically.
3
 A number of studies have either used 
KathmanÕs data or their own versions to study dynamics related to UN peacekeeping.  
Some studies consider variation in contributions as something interesting to explain using 
theories of international politics. For example, Bove and Elia explore a number of contributor-
level and conflict-level characteristics that help drive peacekeeping contributionsÑthey 
particularly find strong support for the argument that contributions are driven by comparative 
advantages in the availability and costs of labor.
4
 Kathman and Melin discover that the military 
challenges and coup threats in the contributing countries can affect their willingness to deploy 
peacekeepers.
5
 Uzony finds that countries are more likely to contribute when the mission has the 
possibility of attenuating costly refugee flows into the contributing countries.
6
 Ward and 
Dorussen use a network approach and conclude that a contributing countryÕs network placement 
relative to other contributors strongly shapes its allocation of peacekeepers.
7
 All of these studies 
complement the volume edited by Bellamy and Williams, which looks both quantitatively and 




Relatedly, studies have used the UNÕs publication of the gender breakdowns of 
peacekeeping contributions to explore variation in the deployment of women to missions. Karim 
and Beardsley find that the proportion of women in domestic security institutions shapes the 
proportion of women in peacekeeping contributions, as does the participation of women in the 
labor force.
9
 Moreover, they find that a gendered protection norm appears to reduce the 
willingness of contributing countries to send women to the missions that pose the greatest risk to 
the peacekeeping personnel. Crawford, Lebovic and MacDonald additionally find that 
contributing countries are more likely to deploy women when domestic institutions and norms 
are more favorable to womenÕs rights.
10
 
                                                                  
3
 Kathman, ÔUnited Nations Peacekeeping Personnel CommitmentsÕ. 
4
 Bove and Elia, ÔSupplying PeaceÕ. 
5
 Kathman and Melin, ÔWho Keeps the Peace?Õ. 
6
 Uzonyi, ÔRefugee FlowsÕ. 
7
 Ward and Dorussen, ÔStanding alongside Your FriendsÕ. 
8
 Bellamy and Williams, Providing Peacekeepers. 
9
 Karim and Beardsley, ÔFemale PeacekeepersÕ; Karim and Beardsley, ÔLadies LastÕ. 
10
 Crawford, Lebovic and MacDonald, ÔExplaining the VariationÕ. 
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In addition to exploring the determinants of variation in peacekeeping contributions, 
other studies have explored the consequences of such variation. Bove and Ruggeri have found 
that less homogenous missions are less prone to acts of violence against civilians.
11
 Karim and 
Beardsley have found that missions that consist of more contributions from countries with 
relatively strong records of gender equality are less prone to allegations of sexual exploitation 
and abuse; moreover, this effect appears stronger than the observed effect related to increases in 






While these recent studies have advanced our understanding of the provision and consequences 
of peacekeeping operations, data limitations remain that inhibit much more than scratching-the-
surface analyses of the progress that has been made and that still is needed in addressing gender 
inequality in and through peace operations.
13
 Gender inequality is much more than an imbalance 
in the number of women and men, and a number of studies, both qualitative and quantitative, 
have explored the institutionalization of gender power imbalances in peacekeeping operations.
14
 
It is possible that improvements in the representation of women belie stagnation or even steps 
backward in the extent to which women in peacekeeping operations are excluded from important 
functions, discriminated against, or are subject to abuse and sexual violence. Moreover, it is 
possible for improvements in these regards to occur even as the proportions of women in 
missions remain low. 
 Related to the understanding that progress on gender equality entails much more than 
improving the representation of female bodies, the 2015 Report of the High-level Independent 
Panel on Peace Operations, recommends that  
 
In order to strengthen accountability for the implementation of the women and 
peace and security agenda, the compact between the Secretary-General and heads 
of mission should incorporate three gender-related indicators: (a) commitment to 
                                                                  
11
 Bove and Ruggeri, ÔKinds of BlueÕ. 
12
 Karim and Beardsley, ÔExplaining Sexual ExploitationÕ. 
13
 See work by Olsson and Mller (ÔData on WomenÕs ParticipationÕ) for an early assessment of gender-disaggregated data 
related to the UN, EU and OSCE field missions. 
14
 See for example, studies by Karim and Beardsley (Equal Opportunity Peacekeeping); Kronsell (Gender, Sex and the 
Postnational Defense); Duncanson (Forces for Good?); Olsson and Tryggestad (Women and International Peacekeeping); and 
Olsson and Gizelis (ÔAdvancing Gender and Peacekeeping ResearchÕ). See also the edited volume by Olsson and Gizelis 
(Gender, Peace and Security). 
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promoting gender mainstreaming across all mandated tasks; (b) commitment to 
encouraging national leaders to take ownership of the women and peace and 




These Ògender-related indicatorsÓ entail much more than simple counts of women and men on 
missions. Much more information is needed to understand how well gender is being 
mainstreamed, how well policy makers of Member States are providing parallel support for the 
women, peace and security agenda, and how well gender parity at all levels of the peacekeeping 






To fully capture the successes and challenges in addressing gender inequality in peacekeeping 
missions, it is important to recognize that regularly published quantitative data on standard 
indicators alone cannot tell researchers and analysts all or even most of what they need for 
adequate assessment. Qualitative reports, periodic surveys and other methods of assessment are 
also crucial for understanding the norms and institutional biases that curtail the role of women in 
peacekeeping operations. That being said, regular indicators that go beyond the simple reporting 
of numbers of women and men in peacekeeping missions can prove critical for comparing the 
status of gender inequality across missions and across time. 
An important and feasible addition to the existing data would be the expansion of the 
peacekeeper demographic data. Just as the counting of women and men is relatively 
straightforward and easy to report, so is information related to age, education, tenure and training 
experiences. Gender is often correlated with these variables, and it is informative at times to 
either untether gender from these other demographic factors or to use the variation in how 
connected gender is to these indicators to understand important shifts in gender inequalities. 
More detailed information on the types of positions that the peacekeepers fill would also 
help better inform the status of and challenges related to gender reforms in peacekeeping 
operations. Currently, monthly gender breakdowns of country contributions are publically 
available by postÑe.g., police, observer, troopsÑbut not by rank or function. Yet gender 
                                                                  
15
 United Nations, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel, 80. 
16
 Kreft (ÔThe Gender Mainstreaming GapÕ) provides an example of a fruitful study along these lines, as she finds that gender-
mainstreamed peacekeeping mandates are more likely in conflicts with high levels of sexual violence. 
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inequity can be manifested not just in the aggregate proportions of women and men but also in 
the proportions when disaggregated by the roles the peacekeepers serve. For example, the 2015 
Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, which presented a snapshot of 
the ranks of peace operationsÕ senior staff broken down by gender, emphasizes the fact that the 
proportions of women are much smaller at the higher ranks. If the overall representation of 
women in peacekeeping missions increases but the gains are only in non-leadership positions or 
only in roles related to medical services, clerical duties or service provision on bases (e.g., 
housekeeping, food preparation), little, if any, progress toward overcoming gender power 
imbalances would have been made. More transparency in the roles that women play when they 
serve on peacekeeping missions would help researchers track important progress toward 
realizing operations that fully value the participation of women. 
 18 
 
Toward an equal peace or stuck in the twilight zone?  




University of Essex 
 
Louise Olsson 
Folke Bernadotte Academy 
 
Advancing research on peacekeeping requires a more in-depth understanding of what kind of 
peace peacekeeping operations contribute to establishing.
1
 A central dimension which we have 
previously highlighted is the gender-specific dimension.
2
 To advance research by taking a closer 
look at peace from a gender perspective is very timely. In some sense, such a shift is underway in 
some of the suggestions outlined in the United Nation High-level Independent Panel on Peace 




We argue that such progression could be fruitfully developed along two paths prominent in 
current research debates and data collection. The first trend is to expand on the form of negative 
peace to include not only loss of life but also sexual violence and other non-lethal forms of 
violence for both men and women. The second trend outlines an understanding of peace which 
encompasses gender equality considerations more broadly defined as captured by indicators of 
development.
4
 If peace is not broadened, many of the security threats and effects of conflict 
affecting women will not be visible.  
In this commentary, we expand on the Òknown knownsÓ on how existing gender disaggregated 
data can be leveraged to advance research and as well as Òknown unknownsÓ, or data we still 
lack. We do this around the identified two versions of peace; the expanded form of negative 
peace and the broader peace including peacebuilding dimensions. We will give a few examples 
                                                                  
1
 Virginia Page Fortna, and Lise Morj Howard. ÒPitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping LiteratureÓ.  
2
 Louise Olsson and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis ÒAdvancing Gender and Peacekeeping Research.Ó; Theodora-Ismene Gizelis and 
Louise Olsson. Gender, Peace and Security: Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1325. 
3
 United Nations Secretary-General, ÒThe future of United Nations peace operations: implementation of the recommendations of 
the High-level Independent Panel on Peace OperationsÓ, A/70/357-S/2015/682, 2 September 2015. 
4
 Theodora-Ismene Gizelis and Jana Krause. Exploring gender mainstreaming in security and developmentÓ. 
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of recent or ongoing projects which have systematically addressed these areas and illustrate 
interesting data conundrums as well as bring out gaps in existing data and suggestions for 
relevant research questions. 
 
Gender-disaggregated data on extended negative peace 
The extended versions of negative peace Ð lack of physical violence by the warring parties Ð 
should be understood in terms of how violence and protection are distributed between men and 
women, i.e. security equality. There are a number of key areas where gender disaggregated data 
and data collection are key. Following policy debates, research has begun to examine 
peacekeeping operationsÕ capacity to handle conflict-related sexual violence
5
 as well as the 
related areas of implementing gender-aware protection of civilians.
6
 In addition, the halting of 




So, does wide-spread conflict-related sexual violence affect the probability of a peacekeeping 
mission being established? And can such operations actually contribute to protecting civilians 
from such violence? These are questions raised in two projects, by Theodora-Ismene Gizelis and 
Michelle Benson, and by Lisa Hultman and Karin Johansson, which seek to develop mainstream 
peacekeeping research through gender disaggregated data. Ideas around gender-aware protection 
of civilians developed in the mid-2000 when sexual violence, strengthened by the development 
of the protection of civilian mandates resulting in Security Council Resolution 1820. With this 
resolution, the mandates and expectations to be able to handle sexual violence became more 
pronounced. Combining peacekeeping data with data from the Sexual Violence in Armed 
Conflict dataset, Hultman and JohanssonÕs preliminary study indicate that missions operating in 
an environment where rebels control the territory then the pressure and oversight of a 
peacekeeping operation might decrease levels of sexual violence. If there is low cohesion and 
poor command and control in the rebel forces, however, the effects can be very limited.
8
 Looking 
at UNSC resolutions, Benson and Gizelis find that indeed there is a strong correlation between 
reports of sexual violence in a conflict and the likelihood that the UN SC will refer to the conflict 
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in a resolution. This pattern precedes resolution 1325 and seems more likely to follow the 
debates on the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the genocide in Rwanda which had very high 
levels of sexual violence.
9
 
The last point concerns the ÒunintendedÓ effects of peacekeeping on negative peace, sexual 
exploitation and abuse by peacekeeping personnel. By addressing this form of violence and 
crimes by international personnel the Security Council resolution 2272 has increased political 
pressure  by renewing this debate. In research, the lack of data has long been a problem by 
preventing any progress, but recently, we have seen a gradual improvement. Sabrina Karim and 
Kyle Beardsley«s upcoming book and recent article
10
 using a combination of secondary sources 
and survey data, and Ragnhild Nords and Siri RustadÕs data set
11
 using formal reports show that 
it is possible to improve our knowledge of this area. It would also be very interesting to relate 




Into the twilight: data on peace, development and gender equality 
If we are instead to view peace in a broader sense we come to the areas where peacekeeping 
transitions into peacebuilding. Here, gender equality aspects become more apparent and there are 
a number of central areas for womenÕs security and for the distribution of resources and power 
which should be considered in gendered terms. Hence, moving forward on understanding what 
peace entails for women and what it entails for men. That is, how equal is the peace? Focusing 
on womenÕs security, this involves answering questions such as: Is it a situation where there is 
more crime substituting residual violence and what does that mean for menÕs and womenÕs 
security? Is there more sexual violence against women? What type of society emerges from the 
conflict experience? Do different types of peacekeeping and peacekeeping policies impact the 
levels of violence in a post-conflict country? 
 
In this area, there are a number of data challenges, primarily related to the need for more 
disaggregated data, particularly in-depth data on more cases in order to obtain comparative 
studies on how peace is shaped in the post-conflict environment for both genders, but especially 
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for women. For example, if we want to expand the concept of violence to also include broader 
gender-based violence, there is still very limited data on physical violence against women 
(including domestic violence).
 13
 Since there is now a Sustainable Development Goal on gender 
equality where eradication of violence against women is a sub-goal, the hope is that data will be 




Hence, moving forward on understanding what peace entails for women and what it entails for 
men. I.e. how equal is the peace? In this area, we need to collect more disaggregated data, 
particularly in-depth data on more cases in order to obtain comparative studies on how peace is 
shaped in the post-conflict environment for both genders, but especially for women. Current lack 
of data hampers our ability to answer the following questions: Is it a situation where there is 
more crime substituting residual violence? Or is there more sexual violence against women? 
What type of society emerges from the conflict experience? Do different types of peacekeeping 
and peacekeeping policies impact the levels of violence in a post-conflict country?  
As peace(keeping) starts transitioning into the peacebuilding phase related to development, it is 
also important to consider what kind of economy emerges in a post-conflict country and to what 
extent peacekeeping missions shape the economic structures. What are the effects of the 
measures undertaken for gender equality? For example, do gender mainstreaming policies lead to 
more inclusive development pathways? How can peacebuilding and post-conflict development 
use gender mainstreaming to encourage pathways to development that improve social equity and 
minimize structural conditions for conflict?
15
 
A way forward is to think creatively of combining existing datasets such as WomenÕs stats with 
datasets on the location of peacekeepers to evaluate if peacekeeping makes a difference on 
womenÕs life and under what conditions. An example will be the recent study of Theodora-
Ismene Gizelis and Xun Cao on peacekeeping and maternal health indicators with strong 
evidence that peacekeeping has positive effects on both education and health indicators and 
subsequently on maternal health.
16
 This is one of the first studies to look at different dimensions 
of peace and in particular womenÕs health and compare countries and regions within countries 
that experienced peacekeeping missions to those without. 
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Concluding, to answer these questions, we need more data on peacekeeping activities and 
policies and extension of the peacebuilding into the post-conflict phase and how the continued 
path of development can be more or less equal. 
 23 
 
What do we know about UN peacekeeping leadership? 
Vincenzo Bove 
University of Warwick 
Andrea Ruggeri 
University of Oxford 
Remco Zwetsloot  
Yale University 
Does the composition of a peacekeeping operationÕs leadership matter for its effectiveness?
1
 Can 
individuals in crucial positions make a difference? Anecdotally, the answer would seem to be 
yes; observers frequently cite the leadershipÕs quality Ð or lack thereof Ð as reason for a 
missionÕs success or failure.
2
 At the same time, however, the United Nations made only vague 
references to PKO leadership in its recent peacekeeping review,
3
 and one could reasonably argue 
that the authority of mission heads is so limited in practice that they are unlikely to make much 
of an impact.    
 
It is difficult to evaluate whether leadership matters without systematic data Ð anecdotal evidence 
can be suggestive, but leaves a lot of room for skeptics to attribute events and change to 
circumstances and structural factors rather than individuals. Comprehensive quantitative 
evidence could address several of these skepticsÕ concerns, but the statistical study of UN 
mission composition is still in its infancy; in a recent study, Bove and Ruggeri analyze how the 
national composition of Blue Helmets (i.e., the Òboots on the groundÓ) affected their capacity to 
protect civilians.
4
 We still lack a systematic empirical investigation of leadership, however. A 
second challenge is formulating testable hypotheses based on the general idea that leaders matter 
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Ð what specific aspects of leadership do we expect to have an impact, and what are the operative 
mechanisms?  
 
UN Mission Leadership: New Data  
 
To begin to answer these questions in a systematic fashion, we have been collecting data on 
different facets of UN PKO leaderships. Specifically, as part of a data-gathering pilot project,
5
 
we have collected information on each Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG, 
civilian head) and Force Commander (FC, military head) for UN PKOs in Africa and Asia for 
the post-Cold War period, including their nationality, tenure, and prior experience.
6
 In the future 
we aim to extend the data geographically, covering other continents, and temporally, to UN 
missions before 1989. Once collection efforts are finished, this data will allow us to convincingly 
answer whether leaders matter in the first place, and, if so, how they do so.  
 
In our larger project we elaborate several possible mechanisms and interactions through which 
leadership could affect UN mission effectiveness. From an organizational perspective, windows 
of leadership change involve adaptation on part of both the new leadership and the troops and 
staff, which could slow down decision-making processes. Moreover, if a missionÕs leadership 
changes frequently this might negatively affect the missionÕs strategic coherence. There are also 
two analytical levels where leadership might exacerbate or dampen possible coordination 
problems. First, internally the SRSG and FC might face barriers to cooperation, for example if 
the strategic interests of their national principals diverge. Second, vertically the leadership needs 
to work effectively with Blue Helmets in the field; here, coordination problems could emerge 
from a lack of smooth communication (e.g. due to linguistic difficulties) or differences in 
military and diplomatic training (e.g. due to different norms and daily practices).   
 
In the remainder of this article we provide some data and figures to show interesting variation in 
PKO leadership dynamics, and discuss why such variation may matter. Recent research has 
highlighted that deployment size matters,
7
 but, as Figure 1 highlights, leadership dynamics are 
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separate from deployment size and may have independent effects. Using MONUC (D.R.C.) as an 
example, we can see that at the start of the mission the Force Commander and 30% of the troops 
(red line) are from Senegal. As the mission expands (see blue line) the relative contribution of 
Senegalese troops declines, but military leadership remains largely in Senegalese hands (except 
for two very short spells where the FCs were from Nigeria and Spain, respectively). Does the 
nationality of the FC affect his
8
 countryÕs contribution, and if so, when and how? Do differences 
between Blue Helmets and the leadership (the vertical dimension highlighted above) play an 
important role? These new data will enable us to give more robust answers to these questions in 
the near future. 
 
 
FIGURE 1: Over time example MONUC mission 
 
 
In Figure 2, we provide three temporal density distributions based on our data: UN mission 
duration generally and UN FCsÕ and SRSGsÕ tenure in office specifically. Of the 38 UN missions 
in our dataset covering Africa and Asia between 1989- 2015, the average length of the mission is 
70 months with a median of 37 months. These numbers put the ÒsurvivalÓ of FCs and SRSGs in 
context. On the military side, the average time in office of a FC is 19 months. The shortest spell 
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was the one of Vicente Diaz Villegas (Spain) in MONUC, where Spain contributed only 6 troops 
(0.03% of the total number). The longest serving FC was Dewan Prem Chad (India), who was at 
the helm of UNTAG in Namibia for  roughly 10 years; in UNTAG, IndiaÕs contribution was, on 
average, over 50% of all Blue Helmets. In terms of civilian leadership, SRSGs serve slightly 
longer than FCs on average (23 months). The shortest-serving SRSG was Ismat Kittani (Iraq) in 
Somalia (UNOSOM I) at just 4 months, whereas Martti Ahtisaari (Finland), with nearly 12 
years, served the longest period (in UNTAG). 
 









LeaderÕs characteristics can affect missionÕs performance in a ÒmonadicÓ fashion. One example 
of a hypothesis that would be testable with our data concerns the prior experience of individuals 
in PKO leadership roles. Pierre Schori, former SRSG for UNOCI, argues that many in leadership 
positions have trouble understanding the intricacies of UN missions and recounts that he Òwas 
fortunate to have [deputy SRSG] Alan Doss, who had previous experience in the mission and in 
the region, at my side in the first year of service.Ó
9
 Given that high turnover rates and the 
resultant repetition of mistakes are among the most common criticisms of UN PKOs,
10
 it seems 
intuitive that having prior experience in UN peacekeeping should lead to more effective 
leadership and better overall mission performance.  
 
There are also reasons, however, to think that experience within the UN can be a bad thing. 
Senior staff moving from one mission to another could import the wrong lessons, as happened 
when cynical views of locals were brought to East Timor from Kosovo,
11
 or they could be too 
engrained in UN bureaucratic thinking to take a flexible approach on the ground. In post-war 
Mozambique, for instance, SRSG Aldo Ajello used his connections with the Italian government 
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to procure funds for important project outside of the UN bureaucracy Ð to the chagrin of many in 
New York but to the benefit of the missionÕs effectiveness.
12
 These contrasting examples beg the 
question: are leaders who spent their careers as part of the UN system more or less effective than 
those who come in from the outside?  
 
This question is especially interesting given the changing nature of leadership composition. 
Although there are exceptions, the data reveal a general trend toward the selection of leaders 
with a background in the UN, perhaps reflecting a belief that such individuals are more effective 
in leadership roles. Nearly all current force commanders, for example, have previously served in 
PKOs as commanding officers or senior staff, whereas during the 1990s most force commanders 
only had experience in their national militaries. On the civilian front, MINURSO serves as a 
good illustrative example. The mission has had twelve SRSGs since its conception in 1991; none 
of the seven heads before 2005 had previously served in UN PKOs, whereas all five since have 
peace operation experience.   
 
Internal Leadership Dynamics 
 
Moving to a ÒdyadicÓ approach, we look at the composition of the leadership over time (the 
internal dimension discussed above): does within-leadership political compatibility make a 
difference?  Anecdotal evidence suggests fragmentation among staff can impede the functioning 
of UN missions,
13
 and Òdiverging views within the UN mission senior staffÓ Ð specifically, 
disagreements between the force commander and civilian leadership Ð are cited as reasons for 
slow crisis response in the PKO in Cte dÕIvoire.
14
 Disagreements can stem from the different 
national interests of the leadersÕ respective states, which often influence their UN staff,
15
 as well 
as from cultural or normative clashes.
16
 Such problems are unlikely to arise when the civilian and 
military heads are from the same or very close states.  
 
Within-leadership differences are much smaller in some missions than in others. For example, 
the UNÕs most recent mission in Sudan has been under the exclusive leadership Ð both on the 
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civilian and the military side Ð of Ethiopia since its inception in 2011. In South Sudan, in 
contrast, the civilian leadership has been European (Norway and Denmark) while the military 
leadership has been African (Nigeria, Ghana, and Ethiopia).  Figure 3 provides a more general 
overview that echoes what the comparison above already hints at: there is a clear geographical Ð 
and perhaps geopolitical Ð difference between the main providers of FCs and SRSGs. FCs tend 
to come from countries that provide large numbers of Blue Helmets, whereas SRSGs come from 
other countries. 






Answering questions about the impact of leadership on PKO effectiveness is crucial not only for 
scholars who debate the relative importance of agency and structure, but also for senior UN 
policymakers who care about selecting the best individuals and teams for PKO missions and 
even the national governments that have to decide whether to invest funds and risk their soldiersÕ 
lives. Moving beyond anecdotal examples toward a systematic analysis of UN peacekeeping 







Challenges and opportunities for peace operations data collection: 
Experiences from the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database 
 
Jair van der Lijn  
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 Timo Smit  
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The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has been collecting data on 
multilateral peace operations since the early 1990s.
1
 As a result, SIPRIÕs current data set covers 
more than 200 peace operations that have been deployed in the period 1993-2015, including 
annual statistics on personnel, country contributors, fatalities, and budgets. To our knowledge, it 
remains the most comprehensive and reliable data set on peace operations that is available in the 
field.  
The data are available in successive editions of the SIPRI Yearbook, and in SIPRIÕs 
Multilateral Peace Operations Database.
2
 Efforts are on-going to complement the existing data 
and to make more data available in the online database in a more user-friendly manner. The 
objective is to establish the database more firmly as one of SIPRIÕs major data sets, and as the 
global go-to source of quantitative and qualitative information on peace operations. Although the 
database is already widely used, this will hopefully increase further its contribution to both 
policy and academic research.
3
 
This essay aims to provide an overview of SIPRIÕs Multilateral Peace Operations Database, and 
to elaborate on some of the initiatives and ideas to expand it in order to accommodate the 
growing demand for independent and reliable data on peace operations. It also highlights some 
of the challenges and lessons learned regarding data collection and maintaining a database over a 
period of nearly 25 years.  
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Current SIPRI data on peace operations  
The online version of the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations database currently covers the 
years 2000-2015. Temporal extension of the database to include the 1990s is foreseen for the 
future.
4
 At present, the 1993-2015 time series includes data points on more than 200 peace 
operations and approximately 1400 mission-year entries. The database includes information on 
peace operations conducted by the United Nations (UN) as well as by regional organizations or 
alliances and ad hoc coalitions of states. Besides numbers, the database also provides non-
statistical descriptive information on peace operations (location, conducting organization, legal 
basis, start- and end dates, and leadership) and their mandates.  
     At the mission-year level, the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations database includes statistics 
on personnel, country contributions, fatalities and budgets. The data on personnel are broken 
down into three categoriesÑmilitary, police, and international civilian staffÑwhile data on 
locally recruited national staff is usually also provided. These figures generally reflect the actual 
number of personnel deployed in theatre as of 31 December. The same applies to the data on 
individual country contributions. The data on fatalities are broken down by personnel category 
and cause of death. Of note, the data on fatalities among UN personnel are more detailed than the 
data that is available on the website of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO).
5
 Finally, budgets are calculated per calendar year based on the common budgets 
appropriated for missions by the conducting organization. 
     SIPRIÕs data set has three comparative strengths that are worth highlighting. First, it is the 
most comprehensive source of data on non-UN peace operations. The UN DPKO already offers 
excellent statistics on UN peacekeeping operations on its website, including monthly statistics on 
uniformed personnel that go back as far as 1990. This is certainly not the case for the various 
regional organizations and alliances that have deployed peace operations (some of which no 
longer exist), let alone for missions that were conducted by temporary or ad hoc coalitions of 
states without standing headquarters or secretariats. As a result, most quantitative studies focus 
on UN peacekeeping operations exclusively, despite the proliferation of actors that have 
deployed peace operations since the end of the Cold War.
6
 Second, SIPRI has collected its data 
on an annual basis and in a consistent manner over nearly 25 years. Thanks to this longevity, the 
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current data set enables researchers to conduct large-n studies and study trends over longer 
periods of time. Much of this data would be very difficult (if not impossible) to retrieve now (see 
below). Third, most of the data is obtained directly from missionÕs headquarters or from the 
secretariats of the organizations that conduct(ed) them. They are therefore often considered to be 
the most accurate available.
7
 
In addition to collecting and publishing the data, SIPRI researchers are regularly using the 
database themselves to inform their research on peace operations. Every year a chapter in the 
SIPRI Yearbook is devoted to assessing the recent and long-term trends in peace operations, 
while the data have also featured prominently in edited volumes and policy briefs.
8
 
Challenges for sustainable data collection 
Maintaining an up-to-date database on peace operations is neither easy nor cheap. First and 
foremost it requires continuity, which in practice means dedicated staff and predictable funding. 
Data collection needs to be done regularly and thoroughly in order to ensure consistency and 
prevent data gaps. Although SIPRI has the advantage of its global reputation as an independent 
institute and a long experience gathering peace operations dataÑand, as a result, well-
established relationships with missions and multilateral organizations that provide dataÑthis 
remains a constant challenge.  
Collecting comparable and disaggregated data on current peace operations can be a tedious and 
complicated endeavour. Although some regional organizations have become better at keeping 
track of the number of people in their missions in recent years, their secretariats are sometimes 
reluctant to provide (disaggregated) data because it is time consuming or because they lack the 
authorization from their member states. This has particularly been the case for fatality figures 
and gender-disaggregated data, either because they are not available or because they are 
considered politically sensitive. Moreover, different organizations often apply different 
definitions, which has implications on the comparability of the data they provide. For instance, 
what expenses are covered by the common budget of a peace operation differs per organization, 
which makes it impossible to compare budgets of, for example, missions conducted by the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the UN.  
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Filling data gaps is arguably even harder. When it comes to non-UN peace operations, 
backdating is often difficult as it appears that most regional organizations have not kept proper 
archives on missions that were terminated some time ago. This is not only the case with regional 
organizations with low institutional capacity (e.g. the African Union (AU) and the regional 
economic communities in Africa), but also for organizations like the European Union (EU) and 
NATO. Needless to say, information on past missions conducted by ad hoc coalitions can only 
be found at the level of the contributing countries, which renders it practically impossible to 
retrieve complete and comparable data.  
A future data collection agenda 
In spite of these challenges, SIPRI is considering several ways to expand its current data set. 
First of all, including multilateral operations other than peace operations: The definition of 
peace operations has been subject to change. While it all started in 1948 with a UN peacekeeping 
operation, not only have different organizations become involved in the efforts, but the tasks 
considered to be part of peace operations have also expanded. In addition to the traditional 
deployment of military and police personnel, several organizations currently deploy civilian 
missions. At the same time, a number of robust operations have explored the margins of what is 
considered a peace operation and what may also be considered multilateral war fighting (e.g. 
ISAF in Afghanistan). In addition, regional organizations and ad hoc coalitions have deployed 
among others multilateral counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, anti-piracy, anti-human 
trafficking and smuggling operations, and missions aimed to implement the responsibility to 
protect (sometimes avant la letter). As military, human and financial resources are scarce, if 
states shift their attention to, or increase participation in non-peace operations, then this will 
affect peace operations. For this reason, it would be good to also collect data for multilateral 
operations that are currently considered to go beyond peace operations mandates, but may 
involve such ad hoc joint military efforts, such as the AU-led Regional Task Force for the 
elimination of the LordÕs Resistance Army (RTF), the Multinational Joint Task Force to combat 
Boko Haram (MNJTF) and the anti-IS coalition. In the past SIPRI has already collected data on a 
number of such operations and therefore such an expansion seems achievable. 
Secondly, including gender disaggregated personnel data: The UN only started tracking gender 
data in 2005.
9
 SIPRI followed suit in 2009 when it also began collecting gender-disaggregated 
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data at the mission-level for non-UN missions. Unfortunately these data are incomplete, partly 
because a number of organizations still do not aggregate all their data by gender. SIPRI aims to 
integrate the gender-disaggregated data into its database. Where possible this would be back-
dated and complemented, as well. This may have to be done at the level of contributing countries 
as this appears to be the required level for data collection.
10
 
Thirdly, and less likely to succeed, including monthly statistics: The UN releases monthly 
personnel and fatality figures. These monthly statistics are very useful as mission strength can 
fluctuate a lot during the year. As SIPRIÕs annual snapshot December 31 data cannot be taken as 
an average, analysis of non-UN peace operations would be helped with monthly figures. 
Considering the difficulties that some missions have in providing annual data, for many non-UN 
operations this is unfortunately still less realistic. 
Fourthly, including non-lethal casualty and/or hostile action data: Currently fatality statistics are 
the best cross-operation indicators for threat and risk levels in peace operations. SIPRI has been 
able to collect these data in a fairly consistent and comparable manner over a longer time-period. 
However, fatalities are not an ideal indicator to measure ÔdangerÕ. Improving among others force 
protection and casualty/medical evacuation may reduce the number of fatalities, while in practice 
the instances of troops in contact or attacks increases. This is for example very apparent in 
MINUSMA where European troop contributors have so far suffered no fatalities due to hostile 
action, while the total number of hostile deaths for the mission as a whole is very high. The UN 
has in recent years started releasing data on non-lethal casualties as the result of hostile action 
(injuries) and data on attacks against peace operations personnel. Again non-UN peace 
operations do not report on this in a structural manner, but as with monthly statistics, it is 
questionable whether it will be possible to collect consistent and comparable data on non-lethal 
casualties and/or hostile actions.  
Last, including the true financial costs of peace operations: SIPRI has collected the budgets of 
peace operations. These budgets do not reflect the true costs of peace operations. In case of 
organizations such as the EU and NATO the costs lie where they fall and only a small share of 
the total costs, for example those of combined units or headquarters, are considered in the 
common budget. The UN, on the other hand, includes in its budgets reimbursements for troops 
and equipment, while these do not equal the true costs of an operation either. For some countries 
these reimbursements are more than enough to cover the true costs, while for others the 
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expenditures of their contributions are much higher. Consequently, a good comparison of the 
financial costs of peace operations will require additional data collection. Although such data 
would open up a lot of research opportunities, it would require the huge challenge of going into 
national budgets to uncover the real expenditures of contributing countries. In spite of SIPRIÕs 
many years of experience in collecting and analysing defence expenditure data this would be a 
formidable effort. 
Concluding remarks 
A lesson that could be drawn from all this might be to accept that the available data on all non-
UN peace operations will never be as comprehensive and disaggregated as the data on UN 
peacekeeping operations. While this has implications for the comparability of UN and non-UN 
missions, it does not necessarily preclude the possibility to conduct quantitative analyses on all 
types of peace operations. It does also not mean that no efforts should be undertaken to improve 
and expand existing data sets, as there is still room for improvement that is both relevant and 
feasible. In sum, the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations database is an interesting source that 
has already benefitted a lot of research. It has the potential to become even more useful once it 
has been re-launched, particularly if it manages to address some of the above remaining data 
gaps. Lastly, sharing some of these experiences in SIPRIÕs peace operations data collection and 





Action for Protection: What Peacekeepers Do to Protect Civilians  
Lisa Hultman  
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University 
 
Introduction 
According to UN statistics, more than 95 percent of all peacekeepers currently deployed 
worldwide work in a mission that is tasked to protect civilians. This is now one of the core 
functions of UN peacekeeping and the expectations of what peacekeepers should achieve are 
often high. Recent quantitative work has examined whether peacekeepers are at all effective in 
protecting civilians, and the conditions under which they are better able to do so. Higher capacity 
in terms of larger troop and police contributions, as well as more diverse troop contributions with 
a broader competence, reduce the number of civilians killed.
1
 These characteristics are enabling 
factors that provide the limitations for the missions and determine what it potentially can do. 
However, they do not tell us what peacekeepers actually do with these capabilities on the ground.  
 
A protection of civilians (PoC) mandate can lead to different operational activities on the ground. 
As shown by Holt and Taylor in their comprehensive assessment of four missions with PoC-
mandates, there are considerable variations in terms of what missions do to protect civilians.
2
 For 
example, some missions have particular PoC-units that organize PoC activities among military 
and civilian units and assess the needs for protection. Other missions do not have an explicit PoC 
strategy. Missions also vary to the extent they prioritize protection of civilians. As highlighted by 
Diehl and Druckman, some peacekeeping missions have a great number of tasks that they are 
supposed to carry out.
3
 While some missions see PoC as their main task, others see it as 
something they do in addition to other tasks if capacity allows it. These mandates are extremely 
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challenging; not only because it is a very difficult task, but also because they push the boundaries 
of the three pillars of peacekeeping Ð consent, impartiality, and the use of force. If we are 
interested in understanding how peacekeeping works Ð or does not work Ð to protect civilians, 
we need to improve our data on what peacekeepers do once deployed.  
 
Recording what Peacekeepers Do 
While data on peacekeeping has for long been quite limited, there are several recent and ongoing 
efforts of collecting new systematic data. A few of those data collection efforts aim to recording 
what peacekeepers do. The PKOLED records peacekeeping events based on Reports of the 
Secretary-General (henceforth SG reports).
4
 Based on these data, Dorussen and Gizelis analyze 
the impact of peacekeeping policies Ð in particular whether they aim at strengthening the central 
government.
5
 Likewise, Smidt codes peacebuilding activities by the peacekeeping missions 
around elections using SG reports.
6
 In addition to these datasets that focus mainly on 
peacekeeping policy or activities, Lindberg Bromley codes violent interactions directly involving 
peacekeepers, thus providing a systematic depiction of the use of force in peace operations.
7
 
Those data are collected primarily using news sources.  
 
Adding to these data initiatives, I am interested in identifying what peacekeepers do with regards 
to protection of civilians. Within my project on peacekeeping and civilian protection, we have 
gone through 273 Reports of the Secretary-General of all UN missions with a PoC-mandate 
(2000-2013) and identified a number of activities that peacekeepers carry out to the end of 
civilian protection.
8
 These activities can be categorized into three main types, as suggested by 
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Hunt and Bellamy, namely direct protection, indirect protection, and capacity-building.
9
 Here I 
will briefly discuss the types of activities that peacekeepers engage in and that are reported in 
these SG reports.  
 
Some reported peacekeeping activities relate directly to protection of civilians. These include 
patrols in areas where there is a discernible risk of violence against the civilian population and 
the provision of shelter for civilians that are escaping ongoing killing campaigns by armed 
actors. Another important action that can signal credible commitment to civilian protection is the 
redeployment of troops within the country to areas where there risk of civilian atrocities is 
intensified, as well as military operations to stabilize an area. While these activities all refer to 
military action in some way, they reflect different mechanisms through which peacekeeping can 
influence the behavior of armed actors and improve security for the civilian population.  
 
Other activities may serve to improve protection more indirectly, such as human rights 
monitoring and reporting, which can inform the military and the police in their preventive work 
as well as naming and shaming of perpetrators. Disarmament of armed actors can reduce the 
immediate threat to civilians as well as reduce the number of guns available to armed actors. 
Some missions provide military escorts to humanitarian assistance, which may enable other 
actors to work towards protection and addressing the needs of the civilian population. 
Peacekeepers also engage in different forms of community outreach activities, which may 
indirectly serve protection.  
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There are also more long-term strategies towards building security, such as providing training 
and advice to military and police forces as well as supporting the rule of law. Such activities are 
intended to rebuild the capacity of domestic institutions and enable the withdrawal of UN forces.  
 
The fact that these types of activities are carried out by peacekeepers is not new information. 
However, knowing that something occurs does not mean that we know how when and where it 
occurs. By systematically collecting information about when different types of activities are 
carried out, and how missions vary in their portfolio of protection activities, we are able to 
address new questions about peacekeeping mechanisms and refine our theories of how 
peacekeeping works. For example, it is possible to evaluate the implications of more robust 
tactics for effective management of violence in the short term as well as for mission success in 
the long term. It would also enable an analysis of what factors determine the types of activities 





The Known Unknowns: Challenges of Data Collection 
Systematically coding PKO activities from SG reports certainly carry some challenges. Apart 
from the general challenges of coding high-quality data, there are some shortcomings in terms of 
what is reported in the SG reports.
11
 First of all, not all actions are reported. The reports are 
selective in their description of what the missions have done in the period covered by the report. 
They are also biased, since these are descriptions of what the missions themselves think are the 
most important things they have done and achieved. On the positive side, the reports are likely to 
include information on the most common and the most formative activities carried out. Hence, 
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we should be able to capture the most important trends over time and across missions. At the 
same time we are less able to get at the variations in behavior on the tactical level, and it may be 
these subtle variations in behavior on the ground that really matter for how peacekeepers are 
perceived among the local population and the warring actors. These nuances are better explored 
through other types of data collection. 
 
Second, the reports provide limited information about the scope of activities and the intensity of 
various actions. For example, while a report may say that the mission carried out patrols in a 
particular area, it would rarely provide specific information about how many troops participated 
in the patrol, or how many hours the patrols lasted. Likewise, a report may describe that the 
mission has engaged in disarmament, but not specify how many weapons were destroyed. This is 
problematic if the scope or intensity of these activities is what really matters. However, data 
collected from the reports can provide us with a first comparison of what missions do, before 
moving into the more detailed comparisons that would require additional data collection.  
 
Since most forms of data collection have different shortcomings, the way forward is to combine 
different types of data. Therefore it is encouraging to see the advancement in the field of 
peacekeeping studies towards more and better data Ð and with that, the ability to address new 
important questions about when and how peacekeeping works. 
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Peacekeeping Event Data: Determining the Place and Space of Peacekeeping12 
 
Han Dorussen   
University of Essex  
 




Recent literature on peacekeeping recognizes the importance of local conditions as determinants 
of the Ôspace for peaceÕ and, at the same time, treats Ôbottom-upÕ peacekeeping as a central 
criterion for its effectiveness.
13
 Accordingly, we have collected event data to analyze the impact 
of peacekeeping at a highly disaggregate, or local/subnational, level. Peacekeeping events are 
defined as data points where peacekeepers are either actors or targets of an action at a specific 
location and time point. Ideally time and place are recorded at the highest precision Ð indicating 
exact longitude and latitude as well as exact time of day Ð but often such precision remains 
elusive. Regardless, peacekeeping event data help to identify where peacekeepers are deployed, 
what they do, with whom they interact, as well as the quality of the interaction. 
We have engaged in four efforts to identify peacekeeping events: Peacekeeping Location 
Event Data (PKOLED),
14
 a pilot study to (semi)automate such coding in Automated 
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Peacekeeping Events, PKO Deployment data (PKODEP)
15
 and Peacekeeping Governance data 
(PKOGOV).
16
 The data have provided a better understanding of the local dimensions of 
peacekeeping, and helped to bridge the divide between quantitative comparative research and 
ethnographic case studies. At the same time, the coding and management of event data pose 
some clear challenges. Also conceptually, event data necessitate a careful assessment of the 
salient spatial features of peacekeeping. 
Hence, we differentiate between the place and space of peacekeeping next. Secondly we 
briefly visualize geo-referenced peacekeeping events to highlight key features. Thirdly we 
summarize the key findings of previous research, and conclude by discussing weaknesses in 
existing data and suggesting avenues for future research. 
 
The Place and Space of Peacekeeping  
To comprehend social phenomena requires  Òunderstanding the arrangements of particular social 
actors in particular social times and places É Social facts are locatedÓ.
17
 Accordingly local 
peacekeeping recognizes the importance of activities throughout the area of operations and thus 
corrects for a biased focus on a countryÕs capital. Local peacekeeping emphasizes interactions 
between peacekeepers and locals; for example, when peacekeepers mediate in local disputes. At 
the same time, local peacekeeping is not necessarily bottom-up peacekeeping; for example, when 
the implementation of centrally agreed peace requires peacekeepers to monitor military activities 
at particular localities. Recognizing these distinctions, it is useful to separate the concept of 
locality as place from social space and to link each to unique conflict and conflict resolution 
mechanisms, as well as to distinct roles for peacekeepers. The basic idea is not particularly new 
and is well known in geography. However, the implications for our understanding of 
                                                                  
15
 Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis, ÔOn the Frontline Every Day?Õ 
16
 Dorussen and Gizelis, ÔInto the LionÕs DenÕ 
17
 Abbott, ÔOf Time and SpaceÕ, 1152. 
 44 
peacekeeping and what specific peacekeeping event data are most relevant are not generally 
appreciated. Spatial thinking is Òabout where things are or where they happen, and it is especially 
about where they are in relation to othersÓ.
18
 
The reasons for why a conflict erupts at a particular place are not necessarily local, or 
confined to that space. Localities (places) are more susceptible to conflict if they are either 
strategically valuable or contested.
19
 However, local grievances and agendas also create spaces 
for conflict.
20
 Support of civilians for either rebels or government has often less to do with 
(national) policy or ideology, but instead is motivated by personal grievances and the prospect of 
personal gains. If so, civil war becomes a pretext to settle what are basically local disputes.  
Hence, peacekeepers support peace agreements via enforcement, credible commitment, 
deterrence, and re-assurance.
21
 Note that the first two mechanisms emphasize features of place 
while the latter two focus on space. 
By means of monitoring and reporting on actions Ôon the groundÕ, peacekeepers may 
enable the government and rebels to credibly commit to a peace agreement. The presence of 
peacekeepers in specific localities matters because it binds leaders to act locally in line with 
centrally agreed principles. Further, peace agreements can pose moral hazard problems in that 
they create new opportunities for conflict, for example, when disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration (DDR) or security sector reform (SSR) processes impact on the relative military 
capabilities of government and rebel forces. Peacekeeping event data can help to identify where 
peacekeepers are deployed to monitor the separation of troops or their demobilization. 
Peacekeepers can also substitute for lack of effective control by elites. Peacekeepers fill the 
power vacuum that prevails in the aftermath of armed conflict when governments often lack 
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capacity to effectively control the whole country and to deal decisively with actors that have 
remained outside the peace process.  
At the same time peacekeeping can address local conflicts: peacekeepers need to 
recognize tensions, provide early warning, and increase awareness that conflict often persists in 
parts of the country. Here, peacekeepers are called upon to engage with local conflict dynamics, 
or the local as social space. Providing accurate information again plays an important role in 
dealing with local conflict, but peacekeepers also regularly mediate in local conflicts using a 
broad set of mediation techniques, including gathering information, meeting separately or 
collectively with disputants. Finally, peacekeepers may deter (or prevent) the onset of local 
conflict when their presence and actions discourage parties to use force. UN Peace Operations 
have shifted from observing ceasefires and traditional peacekeeping (which typically requires 
strict neutrality) to active engagement with the fighting parties. Peacekeepers can deter the 
resumption of fighting if patrolling demonstrates effective control. During the conflict, elites 
tend to encourage, mobilize and arm grassroots groups that often fight alongside ÔregularÕ troops. 
Such grassroots organizations can retain a strong local identity and powerbase. Robust 
peacekeeping can however deter the use of violence by spoiler or renegade factions 
To appreciate the value and limitations of peacekeeping along these various dimensions 
requires highly detailed data. The promise of peacekeeping event data is to identify not only the 
presence (and size) of peacekeeping deployment locally, but also with whom peacekeepers 
interact and in what capacity. 
 
Disaggregating Peacekeeping  
 46 
Most of the quantitative literature on peacekeeping that developed in the 2000s
22
 used country 
(or conflict) as the main analytical unit. As we have just argued, theories of peacekeeping imply 
a different analytical granularity, more disaggregated in terms of actors, strategic timing and 
geographical operations. More recently, the quantitative study of peacekeeping has moved to a 
more disaggregated temporal analysis using monthly dynamics and mission size
23
 and 
considering the composition of particular missions.
24
   
Our collections of event data contribute to a further disaggregation of UN peacekeeping 
data to the subnational level and with temporal variation. The event data mainly cover UN 
mission in Africa between 1989 and 2006.
25
 As an illustration, Figure 1 provides a map of 
Angola using data from PKOLED and PKODEP.  The red dots on the left-side map identify 
PKOLED events where UN peacekeepers were directly involved as actors or targets of 
cooperative or conflictual events. The hollow blue squares indicate where the peacekeepers were 
observing cooperative or conflictual events.
26
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Note: Left figure: red dots indicate peacekeeping events with direct UN PKO involvement, blue 
squares are events where UN PKO observed events. Right figure: blue dotes, UN PKO 
deployment relative to size. 
 
Figure 1: Peacekeeping events (PKOLED) and deployment (PKODEP) in Angola 1989-
1999 
 
PKODEP contains information about the deployment of UN peacekeepers subnationally for all 
UN missions in Africa, including information on the size of deployment and the variation over 
time. In Figure 1, the right-side map shows where peacekeepers were deployed. Here, the size of 
the circles is a function of their local deployment size.   
Figure 2 combines information from both datasets. The blue lines are density function 
based on PKODEP to indicate the spatial reach of the peacekeeper deployment. The red dots are 
the PKOLED events, where the transparency of the dots is a function of the number of event at a 
specific location. As to be expected, peacekeeping events (PKOLED) overlap with the 
deployment of peacekeepers (PKODEP). However, and quite interestingly, there are also many 
 48 
instances where peacekeeping events are far from the areas of deployment. PKOLED and 
PKODEP thus appear to present different information about local peacekeeping. 
 
 
Note: density probabilities of deployment (PKODEP) in blue and peacekeeping events 
(PKOLED) in red. 
 




Based on the various projects introduced above, our analyses of the peacekeeping event data 
provide a fairly coherent picture. First of all, UN peacekeeping remains predominantly top-
down. Peacekeepers engage more, and more cooperatively, with government (or central) 
 49 
authorities; in particular, if the UN rebuilds central administration.
27
 Collaboration with rebel 
authorities is more problematic; particularly when the UN is seen as replacing central authority.  
We have also found that relatively weak rebel groups (compared to the central 
government) are more cooperative towards larger UN peacekeeping missions, possibly because 
they offer effective protection.
28
 Here we were able to evaluate the role of power relations 
between incumbent and rebels vis--vis the UN peacekeepers creating data events with monthly 
variation and coding cooperative actions toward the peacekeepers. 
Turning to the subnational deployment of peacekeepers, we find that peacekeepers are 
deployed to conflict areas within countries, but with a considerable time delay. They also tend to 
deploy near urban areas.  These findings rely on geo-referenced information on UN deployment 
(PKODEP) in African UN missions in between 1989 and 2006.
29
 Finally, even controlling for 
selection bias in deployment and interaction, peacekeepers tend to control conflict locally, but 
we have found no evidence that they are able to prevent local conflict. Peacekeepers are 





Discussion and Future Research 
The different peacekeeping event data we have collected share a number of features and possible 
limitations. First of all, they focus on United Nations peacekeeping and rely predominantly on 
reports of the UN Secretary General. We recognize that regional organisations increasingly 
participate in peacekeeping, and the responsibility for peacekeeping is regularly shared between 
the UN and regional organisations, such as the EU, AU and OAS
31
. Peacekeeping events are now 
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also more widely reported and access to local media has improved. Social media are potentially a 
further source of valuable information. On the balance, we are yet to be convinced that the 
Ônoise-to-informationÕ ratio justifies a coding of all these sources, but given the advances in 
(semi-)automated coding our original decisions seem overly restrictive. 
Secondly, the various dataset all rely on hand coding. The data are quite detailed in 
identifying actors and activities, but unfortunately much less so in identifying place and time. 
Intercoder reliability, in particular, with regard to identifying unique events, has proven to be a 
serious concern.
32
 More practically, updating and maintaining data has been challenging. 
Currently, the data tend to cover the period 1989 Ð 2006 with only the deployment data more 
updated. In our opinion, (semi-)automated coding of peacekeeping events is promising. We were 
able to develop dictionaries that result in a 70 Ð 80% accuracy in identifying events. Given the 
increasing interest in peacekeeping event data, it would also be very fruitful avenue for future 
collaboration.   
Thirdly, the peacekeeping event data are geocoded (although with varying precision) 
allowing them to match to data-grids (such as the PRIO-grid
33
). The obvious advantage is that it 
allows researchers to link peacekeeping data with other geo-referenced data on terrain, 
demographics, and conflict.  
In our opinion and given the salience of debate between macro and micro dynamics of 
conflict resolution, as well as the need to distinguish between the space and place of local 
peacekeeping, more disaggregated data are not just useful but necessary. Peacekeeping event 
data help to identify the presence (and size) of peacekeeping deployment locally, but also with 
whom peacekeepers interact and in what capacity. The full potential of our data is yet to be 
explored. However, it is promising that we have now data (PKOLED) identifying when 
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peacekeepers interact with local, rebel and central authorities and whether peacekeepers are 
directly involved or mainly observers. PKOLED further identifies a large number of events or 
activities that can be aggregated into meaningful categories.
34
 Further, PKODEP indentifies 
where peacekeepers are deployed, their size and who they are. Future challenges include how to 
semi-automate data collection in order to improve data quality, provide data updates and extend 
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Peacekeeping Research with Non-Peacekeeping Data 
Paul F. Diehl12 
University of Texas-Dallas 
Behavioral studies of peacekeeping that rely on large N data analyses are relatively recent, at 
least compared to studies of war, conflict, and international organizations.
3
 Data gathering can be 
a time consuming process and usually requires a driving theoretical orientation. For example, 
data on alliances and power are derived from a realist theoretical framework. The availability of 
data specifically devoted to peace operations was lacking, and there was no consensus or debates 
on a theoretical approach to study peacekeeping.
4
 Indeed, the extent to which liberalism was the 
predominant theoretical lens was more as a target of criticism than a way to study peacekeeping 
empirically.  
 
As is evident from the other essays in this issue, there has been an upsurge in peacekeeping data 
collection. Nevertheless, peacekeeping scholars still rely on existing data collections about other 
phenomena even as these cases and variables were originally designed for other purposes. What 
variables from non-peacekeeping data sets are most frequently employed? To what extent do 
such data sets map well with the foci and purposes of peacekeeping research? In what areas 
might existing data be better used in peacekeeping research?  
 
Non-Peacekeeping Data: General Patterns  
Perhaps not surprisingly, data based analyses on peacekeeping have tended to have original data 
collection with respect to the independent or predictor variables. These have often been binary 
variables about the presence of peacekeeping forces or not (yes/no)
5
 or in a slightly more 
sophisticated fashion with divisions for the categories of mission performed.
6
 Preexisting 
independent variables unrelated to peacekeeping are often used as control variables in statistical 
equations to account for other factors that might influence outcomes (e.g., the renewal of 
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violence) and to allow analysts to gauge the relative effects of those factors vis--vis 
peacekeeping.
7





Most commonly, non-peacekeeping data are used with respect to the dependent or outcome 
variables of interest, depending on the focus of the study. Some past studies have used 
peacekeeping data to predict troop or financial contributions to peacekeeping operations
9
, or the 
length of operations
10
, and such data are easily accessible, most commonly for UN operations. 
Nevertheless, the predominant practice for non-peacekeeping data has come when the concern is 
with Òpeace durationÓ or the time from a cease-fire to the onset of renewed violence or war. In 
those studies, scholars have relied on conflict data sets such as those from the Correlates of War  
Project
11
 and the Uppsala Data Project
12
 respectively. Normally, the outcome variable is 
measured in terms of months or years, with the conflict data providing the end point for the event 
in question. There are several problems associated with the use of such data for peacekeeping 
analyses, although some recent refinements have made these less severe.  
 
Death Counts  
In determining whether war or substantial violence has reoccurred, conflict data sets typically 
rely on a fatality count. When that number exceeds a given threshold (the most popular data sets 
have 25 and 1000 deaths as thresholds respectively),
13
 war or violence is coded as occurring and 
the peacekeeping operation is said to have failed at that point. The data on war and violence 
renewal comes from some of the most respected data projects in the world, known for exacting 




There are two problems with this for peacekeeping purposes. First, the threshold for a situation 
to be labelled a war or renewed violence is very high for some collections; the COW standard of 
1,000 deaths in a given year is substantial. Is a peace operation really successful if there is 
substantial violence, but it falls short of that threshold? Should cases in which few or no 
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casualties occurred be classified the same Ð as successful Ð as operations in which several 
hundred fatalities occurred during the operation? Clearly this is a problem for studies of conflict 
reoccurrence more generally, but is particularly pertinent for attempts to assess the influence of 
peacekeeping operations.  A solution to this would be to use the raw number of deaths (interval 
measure) rather than a dichotomous distinction (yes/no for civil war recurrence). Unfortunately, 
war deaths are often imprecise, and data for cases short of the war threshold might be 
unavailable. One could also use the lower 25 death standard from the UCDP collection.  This is 
more likely to pick up lower-level conflict (<1000 deaths) that analysts would regard as serious. 
Nevertheless, it also risks declaring an operation to be a failure if there is a relatively small 
number of isolated incidents. 
 
Some scholars use casualties or violence incurred by peacekeeping soldiers as an alternative or 
surrogate for violent activity; these are usually reported and widely available.
15
 Peacekeeping 
soldier deaths, although small by any standard, have increased over time. This is likely a product 
of deploying more troops and adopting more robust mandates as well as perhaps the more 
dangerous contexts to which they have been deployed. Thus, using data on peacekeeping-
specific fatalities to indicate effectiveness incorrectly leads to the conclusion that recent 
operations are less successful, an inference that does not take into account operational 
conditions. In addition, peacekeeping fatalities do not map well conceptually or theoretically 
with the purpose of the mission Ð peace operations are supposed to limit the fatalities of others, 
not themselves, as a first priority. Thus, limiting peacekeeping deaths, even controlling for 
Òselection effects,Ó might not be a good indicator of mission success.  
 
A second, and more serious problem, is that fatality counts have traditionally been only those 
that are Òbattle-related,Ó that is between militaries of state actors or involving organized groups 
in civil wars. Excluded are civilian deaths and/or those from militias, terrorist acts, irregular 
forces, and the like. Increasingly, however, peace operations are charged with protecting 
civilians from harm and in facilitating the rule of law. The absence of traditional civil war 
engagement, as reflected in existing data sets, will be misleading on whether peace operations in 
post-conflict contexts are effective in their mandates. There has been some recent improvement 
in data, with scholars now able to consider civilian casualties.
16
 At, present there are some 
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temporal and spatial limitations on such data.
17
 Data exist only for Africa, the Middle East, and 
Asia and only for the period 1989 and beyond; although this covers a majority of UN operations, 
it does limit the scope of analyses.  
 
Data on interstate and civil wars, as well as other serious violence, have also been traditionally 
gathered on a yearly basis; that is, the total number of deaths is recorded for a calendar year. 
Studies of peace duration look at the months or years from the time of peacekeeping deployment 
to war renewal, with longer periods considered more successful. Normally, such aggregation 
might be considered a disadvantage as it is hard to tie, in a causal sense, success or failure at a 
particular point in time to the peace operation. Nevertheless, this is not necessarily a serious 
limitation in peacekeeping studies. The mandates of most peace operations do not vary 
substantially on a monthly or yearly basis in their missions, size, and other characteristics 
thought to influence success.
18
 Indeed, over the life of an operation, peacekeeping does usually 
not exhibit many changes (that is, in a statistical sense, there are no or few time-varying 
covariates). Accordingly, in those cases holistic assessments of a peace operation focusing peace 
duration are appropriate and yearly casualty figures to determine war renewal; such data are also 
suitable for constructing baselines
19
 and for controlling for the length of operations in 
assessment. In some operations, and perhaps increasingly so, however, there are mandate shifts 
and substantial changes in force composition that have an impact on outcomes. In those 
instances, yearly measures of outcomes mask what might have prompted the modifications in the 
operation, and the measures are also misleading in tracking the immediate impact of the 
operational changes that resulted. Monthly data on violence and other outcomes of interest will 
pick up on some of this activity, but this still leaves the problem of many data points in which 
there is no change in peacekeeping characteristics and variation in outcomes (indeed, monthly 
data on outcomes is likely to produce more variation in outcomes).  
 
Where Deaths Occur and Where Peacekeepers Are  
Not only are conflict data aggregated across time (a calendar month or year), but they are also 
combined across space; that is, deaths from war are summed, provided that they occur within the 
                                                                  
17
 See Uppsala Conflict Data Project, UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_ged/ and UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset. 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_one-sided_violence_dataset/ 
18
 See Kathman above for discussion on variation in force size across missions, and Bove, Ruggeri,and Zwetsloot on variation on 
mission leadership. 
19
 For a discussion of the importance of baselines, see Diehl and Druckman, Evaluating Peace Operations. 
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country in question; this is without regard to where they occurred vis--vis peacekeeper 
deployment. Deaths might occur in areas where no peacekeepers were deployed, whereas few 
deaths and little violence took place where peacekeepers sought to keep the peace; this would 
provide evidence for peacekeeping effectiveness. Another possibility is a scenario in which 
conflict is reduced in areas of deployment, but diffused or increased to other areas that are absent 
of peacekeepers; this leads to a mixed verdict on peacekeeping effectiveness. Finally, there is the 
case in which there is no reduction or an increase in violence equal to or more than if no 
operation had been deployed, indicative of failure. With most existing data sets, it is not possible 
to distinguish between these three scenarios, and therefore the potential for misleading 
conclusions is present.  
 
With the advent of geocoded data, there have been some advances in placing specific locations to 
both violent incidents and peacekeeping deployment.
20
 This allows analysts to cross-reference 
whether peacekeepers are sent to areas where violence in prevalent
21
 and whether violence is 
reduced in those areas following deployment. One limitation is that such data are largely 
confined to a few operations in Africa, which may or may not be representative of peace 
operations more generally. Given the general difficulty and expense of collecting such data, as 
well as the inherent problems of doing so for historical operations, it is unlikely that geocoded 





Some Untapped Data Resources  
The above discussion implies that the use of non-peacekeeping data in peace operation can be 
problematic, and in some instances this is accurate. Nevertheless, there are numerous cases in 
which other non-peacekeeping data could and should be employed to answer important research 
questions.  
 
If the focus moves beyond the conflict abatement function of peace operations, there are a range 
of other missions and effects that can be examined. Diehl and Druckman
23
 present a series of 
                                                                  
20
 In particular, see the PKOLED data and Dorussen ÒIntroducing PKOLED.Ó 
21
 Powers, Reeder, and Townsen, ÒHot Spot Peacekeeping.Ó 
22
 Costalli, ÒDoes Peacekeeping Work?Ó  
23
 Note that with a liberal definition of what constitutes a peace operation, Diehl and Balas, Peace Operations, count 188 such 
operations in the period 1948-2012. 
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missions (e.g., humanitarian assistance, promoting the rule of law) that are part of contemporary 
peace operation mandates. For each of these missions, they specify a series of indicators, many 
of them suitable for data collection and several already available in extant data collections. For 
example, trends in the infant mortality rate could be used to assess the impact of humanitarian 
assistance. Unintended consequences of peace operations,
24
 a recent focus of concern, might be 
measured by reference to a series of economic indicators concerning domestic market activity 
and commodity prices. Scholars already use election data and democracy indicators to assess the 
impact of peace operation missions on election supervision and democratization.
25
 There are a 
number of valuable research concerns to be addressed, and existing data are available to help 
answer them. Peacekeeping specific data in these instances would be redundant of existing 
collections or make little sense as many of the dependent variables involve local conditions 
following a peace operation.  
 
There are some limitations to these kinds of analyses, more so in drawing inferences than with 
respect to their applicability to peace operations per se. Many of the newer peace missions 
involve long term processes (e.g., development, civil society institutions). There are time series 
data for them, but the problem arises in assessing the impact of a short-term peace operation on a 
long term process.
26
 Time and intervening variables will complicate conclusions about the 
impact of peace operations, proving that even having valid and appropriate data does not obviate 
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 Aoi, de Coning, and Thakur (eds.). Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping.  
25
 For example, see Fortna and Huang. ÒDemocratization after Civil War.Ó  
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UN PEACEKEEPING DATA 
Laura Bosco 
 
School of International Service, American University 
 
What do we know?  
 This essay focuses exclusively on data on United Nations (UN) peacekeeping and the 
research opportunities afforded by the organizationÕs prolific paper trail.  I first outline data that 
is already systematically collected and consistently made public by the UN.  I survey several 
projects mining these data sources and identify opportunities for expanding collection efforts in 
the future.  These might be thought of as the Òknown knownsÓ of UN peacekeeping data.  I next 
turn to the Òknown unknowns,Ó the categories of data that are only episodically collected, 
inconsistently published, or entirely unavailable.  In this section, I work to differentiate between 
classified source data that the UN is unlikely to ever make public and information that is not 
currently consistently published for more mundane reasons.  The latter subset, I argue, is a 
particularly fruitful area of focus.  I conclude by briefly discussing why the UN and surrounding 
research communities would mutually benefit from more publically available information. 
 
ÒKnown KnownsÓ:  The UN Paper Trail 
 
The UNÕs peacekeeping website publishes monthly and annual factsheets on personnel 
figures and peacekeeper fatalities. Given the PDF formatting, using this data has historically 
been cumbersome.  Fortunately, a number of academic and policy projects have translated the 
factsheet archives into datasets, including Jacob KathmanÕs personnel data (described in greater 
detail in this issue), UCDPÕs ongoing Peacekeepers at Risk project, and the International Peace 
InstituteÕs (IPI) Peacekeeping Database.
1
  These datasets have facilitated more detailed research 
on trends in the provision of UN peacekeepers and analysis of mission success.
2
 
Beyond the factsheets, the UNÕs prolific and relatively transparent reporting mechanisms 
provide additional opportunities for systematic data collection.  Public documents of interest 
                                                                  
1
 Kathman ÔUN Peacekeeping Personnel CommitmentsÕ; Perry and Smith, ÔTrends in Uniformed ContributionsÕ; Lindberg, 
ÔPeacemakers at RiskÕ. 
2
 E.g., Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon, ÔBeyond Keeping PeaceÕ; Bellamy and Williams, eds, Providing Peacekeepers; Bove 
and Ruggeri, ÔKinds of BlueÕ; Benson and Kathman ÔUN Bias and Force CommitmentsÕ. 
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include annual budgets, mission mandates, and Secretary General (SG) reports to the Security 
Council.  Existing peacekeeping datasets have only begun to mine this extensive paper trail. 
Table 1 summarizes key reporting documents, identifies several potential indicators 
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included within them, and lists current datasets and ongoing projects working to encode them. 
Financial reports. Researchers interested in the financing of peacekeeping have used the 
Annual budget, Approved resources annexes, and Status of Contributions reports to analyse 
trends in mission funding and the dynamics of Òburden-sharing.Ó131  IPIÕs newest addition to its 
Peacekeeping Database compiles the monthly, assessed contributions to UN peace operations by 
Member State, from 1994 to 2016.  Additional information that is already systematically 
provided in these UN reports could be incorporated into such a dataset in the future.  The annual 
approved budget reports, for example, disaggregate operational costs.  Katrina Coleman 
leverages this breakdown to highlight significant variation in the average apportionment per 
authorized personnel in the five largest UN peacekeeping operations.132  Similarly, Chart 1 
provides a snapshot of the percentage of mission costs going to operations and logistics, as 
reported in most recent Approved resources annex.133  Such data points could be valuable as 
indicators in future quantitative studies.134  
135 
 
 Security Council Resolutions.  Another important source of systematic and public 
information on UN peacekeeping operations are Security Council Resolutions (SCRs).  These 
resolutions mandate mission tasks, authorize personnel levels, set time limits, and create use of 
force rules.  A handful of reports, articles, and papers have used SCRs to investigate levels of 
armed group compliance with SCR demands, the impact of ÒbiasÓ on mandated force levels, the 
                                                                  
131 Shimizu and Sandler, ÔPeacekeeping and Burden-SharingÕ; Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Shimizu, ÔDemands for UN and Non-UN 
PeacekeepingÕ; Coleman, ÔPolitical Economy of UN PeacekeepingÕ.  
132 For example, military observers cost $38,933 (on average) in UNAMID versus nearly twice that ($63,696) in MONUSCO, in 
2012-2013. Coleman, ÔPolitical Economy of UN PeacekeepingÕ, 8.  
133 UNGA Fifth Committee, ÔApproved ResourcesÕ.  
134 The percentage of mission budgets consumed by operational costs might serve as a proxy for operational difficulty. Tracking a 
missionÕs budget changes over time might capture increasing economies of scale. 
135 Note: UNTSO and UNMOGIP are still funded in the regular budget. Identifying and accounting for such idiosyncrasies will 
certainly complicate datasets construction, but these are not insurmountable challenges. 
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determinants of mandate flexibility, and the relationship between levels of sexual violence and 
Council engagement.136  Two projects publically provide their data online.  First, the Benson and 
Kathman data codes SCRs for bias, covering all those related to African civil conflicts from 1991 
to 2008.137  A recently presented paper mentions an ongoing effort to expand this data to include 
all civil wars, as part of a Civil Conflict Resolution dataset.138  Second, IPIÕs multiyear Security 
Council Compliance project created a public database that encompasses 617 resolutions, covers 
27 civil wars (1989-2006), and specifies 1,988 demands made on conflict parties.139  These 
projects illustrate the creative ways that core UN documents might be used to address important 
research questions.  They also highlight the potential gains of increasing coordination in data 
collection efforts.  At minimum, a consistent naming practice across datasets for identifying 
SCRs would be valuable, to ease merging of these datasets and to support synergistic research 
agendas.140 
 Secretary General reports.  Finally, the Secretary GeneralÕs (SG) reports to the Security 
Council provide a rich, public, and regular source for information on each UN mission.  Most 
reports include standard sections on political developments, the security situation, updates on the 
implementation of mission tasks, and the state of mission staffing and deployment.  Two 
overlapping projects on UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding have used the SG reports to 
construct events-based datasets.  As Dorussen and Ruggeri describe in greater detail in this 
forum, the PKOLED project codes reported peacekeeper responses to conflict events, while 
PKOGOV mines SG reports for events pertaining to peace-building policies more broadly.141  
Others have used the documents to identify specific types of peacekeeping activities, including 
civilian protection and peacebuilding during elections (see Hultman this forum).142  All of these 
efforts begin to address Severine AutesserreÕs call for more quantitative research on the micro-
level practices of peacekeeping, a subfield previously dominated by qualitative and ethnographic 
research methods.143    
A word about tradeoffs.  Using UN source documents comes with a number of tradeoffs, 
both in substance and time.  The standardized formats and predictable provision of the 
                                                                  
136  Mikulaschek and Perry, ÔWhen Do Civil War Parties Heed the UN?Õ; Benson and Kathman, ÔUN Bias and Force 
CommitmentsÕ; Allen and Yuen, ÔUNSC OversightÕ; Benson and Gizelis, ÔUN SCRs and Sexual ViolenceÕ. 
137 The data can be found at: jacobkathman.weebly.com/research.html.   
138 Benson and Gizelis, ÔUN SCRs and Sexual ViolenceÕ.    
139 Cockayne, Mikulaschek, and Perry, ÔUNSC and Civil WarÕ; Mikulaschek and Perry, ÔDo Civil War Parties Heed the UN?Õ   
140 The ISO standard country codes are a good model.  A future integrative project might investigate the effect of mandate 
flexibility (using Allen and YuenÕs data) on conflict actor compliance with Council demands (using the IPI data).  
141 See also, Dorussen, ÔIntroducing PKOLEDÕ; Ruggeri, Gizelis, and Dorussen, ÔManaging MistrustÕ. 
142 See also, Smidt, ÔUN Peacekeeping ActivitiesÕ. 
143 Autesserre, ÔGoing MicroÕ, 496.  
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documents are valuable for collecting consistent data and increasing efficiency in coding.  
However, relying on the UN to self-report simultaneously risks introducing bias (see also 
Hultman this issue).144  Those working with event data generally advise consulting as many 
sources as possible to address such bias, systematic secrecy, and uneven coverage. 145  
Undoubtedly, however, this significantly increases required research time and resources.  
Indeed, the summarized nature and PDF formatting of UN source documents already 
requires substantial time investment to interpret, or simply to transfer, into datasets.  IPIÕs 
Security Council Compliance multiyear project illustrates one extreme.  Thirty PhD students 
worked as IPI consultants to code resolution demands and levels of armed actor compliance.146  
Not all research projects can afford such manpower.  Alternatively, IPI now uses a webscraper to 
encode the UN factsheets for its Peacekeeping Database.  What was once a full time job now 
takes only a few minutes every month to update.147  While impressive, gains from automation do 
have limits.  A recent comparison of hand- versus machine-coded event data in political violence 
research advises caution and emphasizes the limits of current programs.148  In sum, the breadth 
of UN sources publically available offers exciting paths for creative data extraction, but also 
requires researchers to think critically about tradeoffs in terms of substance and resources.  
 
ÒKnown UnknownsÓ:  Limitations and Opportunities for Expanding Data 
 
There are limits to what the UN makes systematically public on its peacekeeping 
operations.  Operating in violent and politically fraught contexts, the UN is understandably 
unlikely to release strategic data.  But there are other categories of data that are not regularly 
available for more mundane reasons, including: (1) time and personnel constraints, (2) 
inconsistent internal data collection, and (3) absence of interest from the public and researchers.  
This section unpacks both subsets of the Òknown unknownsÓ of UN data and argues that the 
latter presents opportunities for future data collection efforts. 
                                                                  
144 .  See also, Ruggeri, Gizelis, and Dorussen, ÔEvents Data as BismarckÕs Sausages?Õ Here, the scholars acknowledge that SG 
reports may present the UN Ôin an overly favorable lightÕ, but argue that competing political priorities and public scrutiny 
mitigate concerns.  Further, the project uses an outside source, ReliefWeb, to randomly crosscheck events as a robustness test  
145 Salehyan, ÔBest Practices in the Collection of Conflict DataÕ; Hensel and Mitchell, ÔLessons from the ICOW ProjectÕ.  
146 IPI Peacekeeping Database, coding manual, 34.  
147 Even as the gains in efficiency are Ôpretty amazingÕ, IPIÕs data manager stressed that the process remains Ôvulnerable to its 
complexityÕ.  A smooth encoding requires that the UN use consistent URLs, that documents are formatted predictably, and, in the 
event that problems arise, that the manager is able to identify and repair glitches. Personal communications. April 4, 2016. 
148 Hammond and Weidmann, ÔUsing Machine-Coded Event Data for the Micro-Level Study of Political ViolenceÕ.    
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  Sensitive data.  The key vehicles for internal tactical and operational peacekeeping 
reporting within the UN system are the Situation Reports (SITREPs).  SITREPs provide an 
overview of the main events and developments effecting the missionÕs operations.  Every UN 
mission transmits daily a summarized SITREP to New York.149  These SITREPs are classified 
because they contain Òimportant details of UN operations and other information not in the public 
domainÉ[and] cannot be published, even in edited form, in any open source environment.Ó150   
That operational imperatives frequently require levels of secrecy that makes research 
challenging is certainly not unique to UN peacekeeping.151  Within the UN system, however, 
there are countervailing pressures to increase transparency on mission actions and 
performance.152  These reflect the need to supplement strained monitoring and evaluation 
resources, as much as a commitment to transparency itself.  Indeed, the frequent refrain that the 
organization must improve information flow and knowledge management on peacekeeping 
makes it unclear, at times, whether the UN refrains from publishing certain information because 
it is classified or simply because it struggles to collect and transmit that data itself. 153  This partly 
connects back to the summarized, textual format of SITREPS, which can obscure operational 
details and make situational awareness and pattern recognition difficult.154 
Inconsistently public data.  Other categories of peacekeeping data appear only 
sporadically in the public record. Ten of the nineteen SG reports on the UN Mission in South 
Sudan (UNMISS), for example, provide deployment maps.155  These maps demarcate where the 
largest contingents are stationed within a host county and designate each unitÕs size (e.g., 
battalion or company), nationality, and type (e.g., infantry or medical).156  As Dorrusen and 
                                                                  
149 For more on reporting requirements, see: DPKO, ÔSOPs for ReportingÕ; DPKO/DFS, ÔUN Force HQ HandbookÕ.  
150 DPKO, ÔSOPs for ReportingÕ, 14.  Additionally, Convergne and Snyder outline the particular sensitivities surrounding 
geospatial UN data. ÔMaking Maps to Make PeaceÕ. 
151 For analogous challenges in conflict and terrorism research, see Gleditsch, Metternich, and Ruggeri, ÔPeace and Conflict 
ResearchÕ; Sandler, ÔAnalytical Study of TerrorismÕ.  
152  E.g., OIOS, ÔSecretariat Evaluation ScorecardsÕ, 6. The internal review concludes, ÒWhile appreciating the need for 
maintaining confidentiality for sensitive issues, DPKO/DFS may want to consider making some [of] its key evaluation results 
publically available, in order to increase transparency and utility.Ó The HIPPO report advises that DPKO introduce Òregular 
independent evaluations using external expertise to assist missions through objective assessments of progress,Ó para 172. 
153 For more on the UNÕs data management as a Òcritical shortageÓ, the need for increased investment in M&E, and the 
organizationÕs general Òdata sclerosis,Ó see: DPKO/DFS, ÔNew Horizon ReportÕ, 15-16, 27; HIPPO, ÔUniting Our StrengthÕ, para 
172; Expert Panel, ÔPerformance PeacekeepingÕ.  
154 Expert Panel, ÔPerformance Peacekeeping,Õ 137. The panel explains, ÒOnly summary data are shared in SITREPs, with rich 
operational details hidden in opaque section-owned spreadsheets, documents and emailsÉ With only textual data sharedÉ it is 
difficult for the mission to maintain an updated view of the state of key indicators.Ó  
155  S/2012/820; S/2014/158; S/2014/708; S/2014/821; S/2015/118; S/2015/296; S/2015/655; S/2015/902; S/2016/138; 
S/2016/341. 
156 In addition, the Geospatial Information Section (GIS) has recently started to sporadically upload maps to its website, 
providing one map at a time for each mission. See: http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/english/htmain.htm. 
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Ruggeri illustrate using their novel PKODEP dataset (this issue),157 mission deployment maps 
offer a valuable means for geolocating contingents and open new research possibilities for using 
spatiotemporal models to assess subnational variation in peacekeeping presence and impacts.  
The public release of backdated maps and regular monthly provision of future maps would 
greatly facilitate such research.  The highly uneven availability of maps currently leaves yearlong 
gaps in the case of some missions.158  
The number of peacekeeping patrols conducted is another new metric recently, if 
inconsistently, available in select SG reports.  Keeping with the UNMISS example, the missionÕs 
four most recent reports include exact figures on the number of long-duration, short-duration, 
dynamic air, and integrated patrols conducted.159  Such numerical detail on the operational 
routine of peacekeeping missions is invaluable in the move towards quantitatively assessing the 
practice of peacekeeping.  
Table 2 presents other metrics that appear in at least one SG report on a UN mission 
within the last year.  From their past inclusion in reports, we know that the Secretariat can collect 
this data and that it does not consider it classified.  What remains unknown is the extent to which 
that data exists historically and across missions, and whether the Secretariat could prioritize 
making it consistently public in the future. 
                                                                  
157 See also, forthcoming Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis, ÔOn the Frontline Every Day?Õ; Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis, 
ÔWinning the Peace LocallyÕ. 
158 In the case of UNMISS, only one deployment map is currently available for all of 2011, none for 2012, and then several each 
for 2013 and 2014.  A GIS officer explained that operational maps Òmay be accessible once a mission becomes liquidated.Ó  How 
frequently GIS creates maps for internal use remains unclear. Email communications. April 12, 2016. 
159 S/2015/296, para 33; S/2015/655, para 37; S/2015/902, para 32; S/2016/138, para. 33.  Note that the numbers were not 
included in the most recent SG report (2/2016/341). A 2015 audit of patrolling by UNAMID military units serves as a cautionary 
note that these numbers should be viewed with an appropriately critical eye, sensitive to the potential for bias and misreporting. 




Synergetic Data Flow:  Or, WhatÕs in it for the UN? 
 
The gains to the academic research community from increasing the scope of systematic 
data on peacekeeping are clear, but what is in it for the UN?  One advantage would be increased 
bandwidth.  As a member of DPKO recently stated, people tend to overestimate the capacities of 
the UN and to assume that, because it is a large organization, it has infinite resources to collect, 
analyse, and distribute data.160  Even beyond constructing useful databases, Jentleson and Ratner 
identify three potential contributions of policy-relevant scholarship, including diagnostic value, 
prescriptive value, and lesson drawing.161  All three, however, implicitly assume a baseline flow 
of sufficiently accurate, timely, and valuable information between the communities. 
 Two organizations might be instructive in their orientation towards data sharing.  First 
the UNÕs own Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs supports two online data 
platforms, ReliefWeb and the Humanitarian Data Exchange.  ReliefWeb Òhas been the leading 
source for reliable and timely humanitarian information on global crises and disasters since 
                                                                  
160 Personal communications, April 4, 2016.  In making this point, it is useful to remember that while the UN and NATO deploy 
comparable numbers of forces abroad, the latter employs four times the number of headquarter staff. Smith and Boutellis, 
ÔRethinking Force GenerationÕ, 7. 
161 Jentleson and Ratner, ÔBridging the BeltwayÐIvory Tower GapÕ, 9. 
 68 
1996.Ó162  The site serves three valuable functions:  (1) collect information; (2) deliver content; 
and, (3) enable better decision-making.163  Outside of the UN system, the World Bank made 
headlines years ago when it began releasing its prized data, giving public access to more than 
7,000 datasets.164  Former Bank president Robert Zoelick explained the decision by stating, ÒWe 
do not have a monopoly on the answersÉ For too long, prescriptions have flowed one way.Ó165  
One close observer of UN data emphasized that while big data projects like these are certainly 
Òsleek and new and attractive,Ó when it comes to peacekeeping data Òplain boring but searchable 
statisticsÓ would be immensely helpful.166  ÒSimply putting them all in one place,Ó he continued 
Òwould get us most of the wayÓ towards more efficient analysis and better, data-driven decisions. 
 To conclude, it is important to acknowledge that the UN is the most transparent of actors 
currently engaged in peacekeeping.  It regularly publishes a number of documents that have 
serve as vital resources for quantitative peacekeeping data projects in the past and, as outlined 
above, already offer fruitful paths for expanding these efforts into the future.  Consistent and 
detailed provision of the identified Òknown unknownsÓ would only further facilitate more 
















                                                                  
162 More at:  http://reliefweb.int/about. 
163 OCHA also manages the Humanitarian Data Exchange, an open platform for sharing data that houses 4,000 datasets, 244 
locations, 729 sources. More at: https://data.hdx.rwlabs.org/. 
164 Stephanie Strom, ÔWorld Bank Is Opening Its Treasure Chest of DataÕ.  For more, see:  http://data.worldbank.org/node/8.  
165 Strom, ÔWorld Bank Is Opening Its Treasure Chest of DataÕ.  
166 Personal communications with IPI data manager.  April 4, 2016. 
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Peacekeeping Data in 2016 
 
Christina Goodness 
Chief, Peacekeeping Information Management Unit 
  Depts. of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support 
United Nations 
 
The issue of International Peacekeeping before you which focuses on data is both timely and 
welcome to the Peacekeeping community. Significant efforts have been taken in recent years and 
are still underway to improve the way data is used to inform conflict analysis and decision-
making, improve transparency and reporting, and strengthen targeted response within complex 
mandates.  With the rising complexity of peacekeeping mandates in increasingly remote and 
actively contested environments, establishing and releasing baseline data on progress in modern 
formats is clearly valuable to all.   
 
Within the recently issued  report on Technology and Innovation in Peacekeeping 
(www.performancepeacekeeping), the Under-Secretary-Generals of Peacekeeping and Field 
Support have prioritised new efforts to use information, data and technology to enhance our 
work in protecting civilians, policing, strengthening rule of law, demarcating boundaries, and 
monitoring post-conflict theatres. While acknowledging the need to improve the slowness of the 
system to use and release data, we know that when we do have regular, reliable, and high quality 
data, we can both act faster and in a more effective manner. This, in turn, improves the 
confidence both within our system and with valued partners. 
 
Regarding the articles in this issue, a number of important issues and questions have been raised. 
High quality and current data on personnel, uniformed contributions, fatalities, financial costs, 
and national origin of leadership is useful to academic partners and Member States in order to 
evaluate peacekeeping performance. The more that these administrative datasets are geo-
referenced, gender dis-aggregated, and declassified in open data formats, the better. 
 
Provocative points are also raised by Dorussen and Ruggeri regarding the value of data on sub-
national tensions and of engagement with local conflict dynamics to inform political response. 
 70 
This echoes points made by the recent High-Level Panel on Peace Operations  that Òthe best 
information comes from communities themselvesÓ, and the Panel further urges improvement of 
peacekeeping information and data in order to understand needs, communicate limitations of the 
system, and coordinate response (A/70/95ÐS/2015/446, para. 98-99).  With an increasing number 
of missions charged with protecting civilians, better data is needed to inform both active 
response and also to undertake frank assessments of what can be done to protect in specific 
circumstances. Data may be able to help manage expectations and to calibrate more relevant 
support in difficult and unstable environments. 
 
The issue of regular release of UN peacekeeping data in modern formats to fill in gaps in public 
and collective knowledge, described by Bosco, is also very timely. As she describes, because the 
Organization releases data in a variety of formats and in an often inconsistent manner, it can be 
difficult to undertake medium- to long-term evidence-driven conflict analysis.  Recognizing this 
same challenge, the Secretary-General has urged all UN capacities to embrace the ÒData 
RevolutionÓ (undatarevolution.org) and has set milestones for all parties to embrace a ÒDigital 
SecretariatÓ (http://www.un.org/sg/pdf/the-change-plan.pdf). Peacekeeping is working towards 
these goals and made much progress, but more efforts are needed to fully tell the story of 
successes and failures of Peacekeeping in 21st Century data formats. 
 
Congratulations are in order to all the authors who have made contributions to this issue on 
International Peacekeeping. It is often through the valuable work of academics and external 
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